

White Racial Polarization Before and After the Election of Donald Trump

Ashley Jardina

George Mason University

Trent Ollerenshaw

Duke University

In 2015, Donald Trump mounted an unconventional campaign for a modern U.S. presidential candidate. Unlike his predecessors from the post-Civil Rights Era, Trump's campaign rhetoric was littered with overtly xenophobic and racist statements—a strategy that politicians had long thought was likely to backfire on a national stage in an era in which norms of racial equality were thought to be well-established (Mendelberg 2001). Trump began his campaign by focusing explicitly on the issue of immigration, and in his campaign speeches, he openly disparaged Mexican immigrants, claiming they were rapists who were bringing crime and drugs to the U.S. (Ye Hee Lee 2015). He also proposed banning all Muslims from entering the country, pledged to deport all Syrian refugees, and indicated that he would strongly consider closing mosques across the nation (Johnson and Hauslohner 2017). A review of Trump's long legacy as a political provocateur suggests that his campaign strategy was simply a continuation of his proclivity to employ racist tactics and messaging (Burns 2015). Notably, for years prior to his presidential bid, Trump had been one of the most vocal purveyors of the rumor that President Barack Obama was a Muslim who had been born outside of the U.S.—an erroneous claim that cast the nation's first Black president as a religious and ethnic outsider who was ineligible for the highest office (Jardina and Traugott 2019).

Trump's race baiting strategy was profoundly consequential. To illustrate, in this chapter, we first describe the trajectory of attitudes about immigration and racial and ethnic groups among white Americans over the course of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. Then we explain how changes in the landscape of race and politics provided an opportunity for a candidate like Donald Trump to capitalize on white grievance politics—a combination of white ingroup racial solidarity and outgroup racial hostility. This tactic was exceedingly effective in the wake of Obama's presidency and in the context of partisan polarization, significant immigration, and the extraordinary increase in the racial and ethnic diversity of the U.S. population. Drawing on recent public opinion research and our own analyses, we also explain how Trump not only successfully attracted support

from many racially hostile white Americans, but how he also, with the support of the Republican Party, catalyzed an unprecedented transformation of white partisans' views on matters of race and immigration over the course of his presidency. Looking beyond Trump's presidency, we then consider whether these changes are likely to be fleeting or enduring.

Racial Attitudes, Racial Realignment, and Racial Appeals in the Twentieth Century


To understand how racial politics changed in the Trump era, we must first reflect on the trends and norms that were established in U.S. politics in the six decades prior to Trump's presidential bid. In the mid-twentieth century, following the dismantling of racist Jim Crow laws in the U.S. South and during the Civil Rights Movement, issues of race, always in the backdrop of American politics, became part of the national political agenda. The two parties took increasingly clear positions on civil rights. At the national level, the Democratic Party championed the Voting Rights and Civil Rights act—a contrast to its southern faction which had long worked to maintain a system of racial inequality. In response, the Republican Party moved to take advantage of the deep racial tensions in the South by opposing civil rights, eroding the longstanding solidly democratic South at the national level. In subsequent years, the parties continued to take more divergent positions on race, with Democrats continuing to support civil rights while Republicans distanced themselves from racially liberal policies (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Chen, Mickey, and Van Houweling 2008; Maxwell and Shields 2019; Schickler 2016).

This position-taking had a significant effect on the party allegiances of the mass public, both in the South and nationally. Over the latter half of the twentieth century, Black Americans came to identify overwhelmingly with the Democratic Party, while white (non-Hispanic) Americans switched their partisan identities so that they aligned with their individual-level racial attitudes (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears and Funk 1999; Valentino and Sears 2005). More racially conservative whites

trended toward the Republican Party, while more racially liberal whites moved to the Democratic Party (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).

To illustrate these changes, we draw on data from the American National Election Study (ANES), a nationally representative public opinion study that has been conducted in every presidential election year since the 1950s. In figure 1, we present the percentages of white Americans identifying as Democrats, Republicans, or independents/third parties over time. We include partisan “leaners” (i.e., independents who declare a preference for one party or the other) in the independent category rather than the two partisan groups. In 1952, 46 percent of white Americans identified with the Democratic Party and 33 percent with the Republican Party. By 1976, after the end of Nixon’s presidency, just 35 percent of whites considered themselves to be Democrats. Republican identification among whites did not see a commensurate rise during the 1970s, likely due to fallout from the 1972 Watergate Scandal, but began to increase in the 1980s. This trend, of whites shifting away from the Democratic Party, has persisted over the past half century. By the time Barack Obama was elected in 2008, just 26 percent of whites identified as Democrats, while Republican identification was in the same place it was in 1952, at 33 percent. In 2020, the most recent ANES data point available at the time of this writing, white identification with the Republican Party had grown to 41 percent, while identification with the Democratic Party had fallen to just 27 percent.ⁱ

Figure 1. Trends in White Americans' Partisan Identification



Source: American National Election Study Time Series. Note: Data are weighted. Partisan groups exclude “leaners.”

The shifting party loyalties of white Americans gave politicians on the political right an incentive to employ racialized campaign messages, which in turn exacerbated partisan realignment. Over the 1960s and 1970s, Republican presidential candidates like Barry Goldwater, George Wallace, and Richard Nixon appealed to the racial grievances of Southern and Northern working-class whites, helping to pry them from the Democratic Party (Frymer and Skrentny 1998). Unlike Goldwater and Wallace, however, Nixon’s “southern strategy” became notorious for its subtle, dog-whistle tactics, rather than the more overt racial fear-mongering employed by Goldwater and Wallace (Phillips 1969). Because of the effectiveness of this more covert approach of appealing to the racial anxieties and hostilities of white Americans, it became a conventional Republican Party strategy. It was perfected by Ronald Reagan with his “law and order” politics and adopted by George H.W. Bush, whose infamous Willie Horton campaign ad became the exemplar of implicit

racial political messages. According to political science scholarship, this use of coded, subtle racialized rhetoric was effective and pervasive because it unconsciously activated whites' racial hostilities without overtly violating prevailing norms of racial equality (Hutchings and Jardina 2009; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). And for the most part, only Republican politicians implemented these race-baiting strategies, since Democrats worried that doing so would jeopardize their base of support among people of color (Mendelberg 2001).

A Gap, not a Gulf, in White Partisans' Racial Attitudes

One of the realities often obscured by this narrative of realignment along lines of race and racial attitudes is that while the parties differentiated themselves on issues of race and immigration in the 1960s and 1970s, by the end of the twentieth century, they were not extraordinarily polarized in their positions (Bateman, Clinton, and Lapinski 2017). Indeed, in the 1980s and 1990s, leaders of the two parties no longer debated fundamental questions about Black voting rights or equal access to public accommodations. Party leaders on either side did not advocate for significant rollbacks of the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s. Reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act occurred with strong bipartisan support during the Reagan and both Bush administrations (Lee 2020). What is more, by the 1990s, Democrats under President Bill Clinton's leadership expressed fairly conservative views on racialized issues like crime, immigration, and welfare. And Clinton's successor, Republican President George W. Bush, argued for a strategy of toning down racism and reaching out to racial and ethnic minorities (Haney-Lopez 2014).

During this era, race became a less salient topic on the national political agenda. After the 1980s, the congressional roll-call agenda featured fewer votes on racial issues (Lee 2009). By the early twenty-first century, racialized issues like crime, welfare, and racial preferences were far less central to national party politics. Meanwhile, immigration had begun to become a more important issue in national politics in the late twentieth century and into the early twenty-first century. Yet

while the Republican Party was notably more aggressive about the issue of illegal immigration, the parties were not markedly distinct when it came to more general questions, like what levels and types of immigration were appropriate. Indeed, over this time, bipartisan coalitions in Congress enacted immigration policies and reforms (Tichenor 1994).

The net effects of these phenomena—partisan divergence on racial issues, white realignment in the mass public, followed by some partisan convergence on racial and immigration policies coupled with the persistent deployment of coded racial appeals by GOP candidates—are at least twofold: First, voters’ attitudes on race over the twentieth and early twenty-first century became an increasingly important predictor of their partisanship and political preferences (Tesler 2016a); second, for much of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century there was a gap between white partisans in their views on race and immigration, but not an extraordinary one (Hutchings 2009; Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022; Tuch and Hughes 2011). White Americans on either side of the partisan aisle, like their respective elites, were arguably fairly conservative both with respect to their racial attitudes and their views on racialized policies. Rather than meaningful cross-party differences in racial attitudes among white Americans, the key demarcation was between the racial attitudes of white Americans and Black Americans, who were substantially more liberal in their racial outlook.

The Renewed Salience of Race in the Obama Era

Many of the trends we have described continued into the presidential election of 2008, when Barack Obama became the nation’s first Black president. Obama himself notoriously downplayed any claims that racial animus motivated opposition to him or his policy agenda (Silva 2009; Tesler and Sears 2010b), even while subtly reminding voters that they had a chance to make history by supporting his candidacy (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012). At the same time, GOP party leaders continued to maintain a policy of toning down overtly inflammatory racial rhetoric. Both of Obama’s Republican Party challengers, John McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 2012, notably

avoided overtly racialized attacks on Obama (Sides and Vavreck 2013; Tesler and Sears 2010a). McCain, for example, famously defended Obama at a campaign event from a supporter who disparaged Obama and referred to him as “an Arab” (Stewart 2018).

Viewed in hindsight, the strategy of suppressing racial conflict by the Republican establishment was a futile attempt to hold the lid on a pot that was beginning to boil over. The racial realignment that had occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century collided with the changing racial, ethnic, and economic landscape of the U.S. The U.S. population was experiencing a rapid increase in racial and ethnic diversity, largely driven by significant immigration in the late 1990s and early 2000s from Latin America and Asia (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). But unlike the country as a whole, the membership of the Republican Party had become overwhelmingly racially and ethnically homogenous. By 2008, according to calculations from the ANES, approximately 88 percent of the membership of the Republican Party was white—well in excess of whites’ 69 percent share of the overall U.S. population (per 2020 Census estimates). In contrast, the Democratic Party had become increasingly diverse; only about 57 percent of Democrats in 2008 were white. Furthermore, Republicans in the mass public were persistently conservative on matters of race and immigration (Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022; Segovia and Defever 2010). Their views had also become increasingly important to their political preferences (Tesler 2016a), in discord with Republican elites’ efforts to avoid engaging with white racial grievance and hostility.

The country’s shifting demographics were magnified by the symbolism of Obama’s election . Race once again bubbled to the surface of national politics. Obama’s association with policies, by way of his racial identity, racialized even seemingly nonracial issues like health care reform (Henderson and Hillygus 2011; Tesler 2012). And as immigration rates continued to climb, so too did media attention to immigration. Coverage was often negative and focused on immigration from Central America, making whites’ hostility toward Latinos more politically salient (Abrajano and

Hajnal 2015; Pérez 2016; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013). Furthermore, white hostility toward Muslims, often only thinly veiled after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, had received renewed attention by way of the pervasive and false rumors about Obama's religious identity (Jardina and Stephens-Dougan 2021; Jardina and Traugott 2019; Lajevardi 2020; Pasek et al. 2015). And many of these groups served as convenient scapegoats to placate the anxieties of white Americans, particularly those without college degrees, who may have also felt left behind by the social and economic consequences of globalization and America's transition into a post-industrial society (Baccini and Weymouth 2021; Walter 2021).

Taken together, the changing demographics of the country, the election of the nation's first Black president, the increased national salience of issues of race and immigration, the significant homogeneity of the Republican Party, and national party leaders' efforts to avoid confronting or pandering to racial hostility stoked the fires of white grievance and created a representation vacuum for racially conservative whites. This brewing storm was buttressed by dramatic polarization, a decline in the cross-cutting cleavages that had previously tempered out-partisan hostility, and an increase in the extent to which many Americans saw their partisanship as an important social identity (Ahler 2018; Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Mason 2018).

Thus, by 2016, the political context was largely unprecedented for modern U.S. presidential contests. Hostility had boiled over. Norms of racial equality, if they were ever truly pervasive, had been eroded by reactions to Obama's presidency, partisan realignment along lines of race and racial attitudes, and growing feelings of entitlement among white Americans (Valentino, Neuner, and Vandebroek 2018). The Democrats under Obama had firmly, if somewhat reluctantly, established themselves as the party of diversity, and the Republicans as the party for whites. The stage was therefore set for a Republican candidate to appeal to the growing racial grievances among white voters. This context is largely what distinguished Trump's success from Patrick Buchanan, who had

run unsuccessfully for president in the late 1980s and early 1990s with a similar political strategy of appealing to aggrieved whites (Jardina 2019b). As Francis Lee writes, “Willing to violate norms against the use of racialized rhetoric, Trump was able to offer primary voters a product that other Republican elites refused to supply (Lee 2020).

White Grievance Politics

One facet that scholars of race and politics overlooked prior to Trump’s success is the diversity of beliefs and predispositions that constitute white racial attitudes in the U.S. For most of the post-Civil Rights era and until Trump’s emergence, studies of white racial attitudes were largely focused on a narrow definition of racism captured by the theory of racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1988). According to the theory of racial resentment, as erroneous beliefs of scientific racism declined over the twentieth century, they were replaced after the Civil Rights Movement by beliefs about the alleged failure of Black Americans to live up to norms associated with the Protestant work ethic, like hard work and individualism. Despite some notable critiques of the theory (Feldman and Huddy 2005; Huddy and Feldman 2009; Sniderman and Piazza 1993), it has largely prevailed as the dominant conceptualization of white racial attitudes in the U.S.

A number of studies have shown that racial resentment was strongly aligned with Trump support (Jardina 2020; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). We join others in arguing, however, that racial resentment only encompasses one element of white grievance politics in the Trump era. One limitation is that the measure is focused on whites’ views about Black Americans, but in today’s more racially and ethnically diverse country, whites’ out-group hostility is likely directed at a broader range of groups. Indeed, a growing number of studies have shown that a wide range of out-group hostilities, including such hostility directed at Muslims and immigrants, were also strongly linked to support for Trump (Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin 2017; Jardina and Piston n.d.; Lajevardi and

Abrajano 2019; Mason, Wronski, and Kane 2021; Reny, Collingwood, and Valenzuela 2019; Tesler 2018).

Second, it is clear that whites' racial hostilities directed at out-groups is not the only dimension to contemporary racism; in addition, inward feelings of racial identity, consciousness, and solidarity possessed by approximately 1/3 of white Americans are also an important element in today's political landscape (Jardina 2019b; Schildkraut 2015; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). This sense of white racial consciousness is distinct from out-group prejudice: many white Americans possess a strong sense of racial consciousness without comparatively strong levels of out-group prejudice, and many prejudicial whites do not share an affinity with their racial group. But white racial solidarity is similarly pernicious because it motivates whites to protect the disproportionate power, status, and resources of their racial group. In a deeply racially egalitarian society, such attitudes serve to reinforce the country's enduring racial hierarchy, even while being psychologically distinct from racial prejudice.

Despite a longstanding interest in the social sciences in social identities—including racial identities among racial and ethnic minorities—and their political consequences (Huddy 2013), much of the work on racial attitudes in the twentieth and early twenty-first century overlooked racial solidarity among white Americans. Most accounts presumed that as the dominant group in U.S. society, whites would be largely unaware of their racial identity absent the day-to-day experiences of racial discrimination that people of color face (Sears and Savalei 2006). Furthermore, whites' pervasive investment in color-blindness, which has often served to preserve white advantage in the post-Civil Rights era, likely dissuaded many whites from claiming a racial identity (Bonilla-Silva 2010; Smith and King 2021). But the political and social shifts we described above—including rapid demographic changes, the increased visibility of people of color in positions of power, and the

growing salience of non-white immigration—have threatened to alter the racial landscape of the U.S., challenging whites’ dominant status.

Whiteness, once arguably invisible, has come to embody both feelings of superiority and of victimhood, characterized by feelings of deprivation and status threat (Craig and Richeson 2014; Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2018; Mutz 2018). As Jardina has shown, whites’ growing sense of racial grievance and solidarity, their desire to protect their group’s power and status, alongside high levels of out-group animosity, has become a potent political force (Jardina 2019b, 2020; Jardina and Piston 2019). Whites with higher levels of racial consciousness are antagonistic toward immigrants and supportive of harsh immigration restrictions. They are also more likely to view politics in racially zero-sum terms, to believe that their racial group is not getting its fair share in American society, and to support redistributive policies framed as disproportionately benefiting whites. And, as we will discuss in more detail below, whites with higher levels of racial solidarity were especially supportive of Donald Trump’s presidential candidacies.

Trump’s Exceptionalism

As we have explained, the dynamics of the political and social milieu in the U.S. by the end of Obama’s presidency provided unique circumstances for a candidate like Donald Trump to emerge. Trump took advantage of the situation in ways that distinguished him both from other 2016 presidential candidates and from most of his modern GOP predecessors. Rather than avoiding racial and ethnic conflict or downplaying issues of race, Trump embraced them during his campaign. First, he spoke to the outgroup hostilities and grievances of many whites. In addition to his draconian immigration policy promises and offensive generalizations about immigrants from Mexico, Trump also spoke disparagingly and stereotypically of Black Americans, describing them to mostly white audiences as unemployed and impoverished (Johnson 2016). He compared refugee Muslims fleeing ISIS and the Syrian civil war to a “Trojan Horse” (Krieg 2017). On Twitter, Trump retweeted

messages from accounts belonging to white nationalists, including from a user with the handle “@WhiteGenocideTM” (Confessore 2016). He was also slow to distance himself from the endorsement of American neo-Nazi David Duke. Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, Trump’s candidacy emboldened white nationalist organizations, including those that protested the removal of a statue of Confederate General Robert E. Lee in Charlottesville, VA in 2017. Speaking about the incident, Trump noted that there were “some very fine people on both sides” (Gray 2017).

Trump’s inflammatory racial rhetoric appealed to the outgroup hostilities harbored by many white Americans. For whites worried about their racial ingroup’s status amidst a racially, ethnically, culturally, and economically shifting America, Trump’s immigration, trade, and outsourcing policies promised restoration, preservation, and protectionism for white Americans in particular (Smith and King 2021). His plans to build a U.S.-Mexico border wall and deport immigrants soothed anxieties about the declining white population and the fading dominance of Anglo-Protestant culture (Graham et al. 2021). He called for rejecting American trade agreements like NAFTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which had been linked to the forces of globalization behind the economic stagnation of working-class whites. What is more, unlike the GOP establishment, Trump promised to protect Social Security and Medicare benefits—programs that whites largely view as benefiting their racial group (Jardina 2019b; Winter 2008). In other words, Trump’s messaging was not merely directed at whites harboring animosity toward racial and ethnic minorities; it was also strategically targeted at racially conscious whites interested in protecting their racial ingroup’s resources (Jardina 2019a, 2020).

The Racial Consequences of Trump’s Candidacies and Presidency

Trump pandered to the resentments of white Americans, to their hostility toward a range of groups, and to their desire to protect their racial group’s privileged status. Counter to longstanding norms of nation politics among candidates on both the left and right, Trump’s messages were overt

and explicit. There is also a considerable scholarly consensus that they were effective. Numerous studies demonstrate that racial resentment, hostility toward immigrants, and antagonism toward Muslims predicted Trump support in 2016 (Dionne, Ornstein, and Mann 2017; Enders and Smallpage 2016; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Lajevardi and Abrajano 2019; Morgan and Lee 2017; Schaffner, Macwilliams, and Nteta 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Tesler 2016b, 2018). Other research shows that Trump also uniquely attracted whites with higher levels of racial solidarity, particularly during the 2016 presidential primaries (Jardina 2019b, 2020; Knowles and Tropp 2016; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Tesler and Sides 2016).

The presumption of much of this research is that Trump uniquely appealed to the pre-existing attitudes many whites had on matters of race and immigration. This work generally begins with the longstanding assumption that racial attitudes are stable predispositions, formed early in life, resistant to change (Goldman and Hopkins 2020; Henry and Sears 2009; Sears and Brown 2013). Politicians' rhetoric and other appeals can activate these attitudes or make them more or less salient to political decision-making, but political elites do not generally change the level or nature of these beliefs. Instead, these attitudes are seen as causally prior to political attitudes and preferences, including partisanship, vote choice, and policy opinions.

A growing body of work, however, challenges these longstanding conjectures. Research suggests that in recent years, political processes, political elites, and the information environment all appear to be influencing the attitudes whites hold about race and how they express these attitudes. Some of this work has found that Trump in particular had an outstanding effect on white racial hostility, increasing it among some whites (Enns and Jardina 2021; Schaffner 2020) and lowering it among others (Hopkins and Washington 2020). Other work points to the influence of additional forces on changing racial attitudes (Lenz 2009), especially the role of party identification in our especially polarized political environment. (Engelhardt 2020c, 2020b), for example, has emphasized


the role of partisan ingroup processes influencing decreasing levels of racial animus among white Democrats during the 2010s.

With this work in mind, we turn to assessing trends in white racial, ethnic, and immigration attitudes from before, during, and after the Trump era. Given the evolving political and social forces we described earlier, and Trump's exceptional race-baiting, we anticipate potentially notable changes in these attitudes among white Americans. Furthermore, because partisan identification and partisan polarization have become such potent forces, we also expect for the attitudes of white Republicans and white Democrats to be diverging over time, and especially during the Trump era.

Changing Levels of Racial Resentment

We begin by considering the attitudes white partisans have toward Black Americans, using the standard four item measure of racial resentment developed by Kinder and Sanders (1996). Racial resentment is theorized as capturing whites' beliefs in individualistic rather than structural factors as being responsible for persistent Black-White racial inequalities in the post-Civil Rights era, as well as anti-Black affect. We draw on data from the ANES Time Series cross-sections from 1992 to 2020, in which nationally representative samples of the U.S. electorate were surveyed. In Figure 2, we present average levels of racial resentment among white Republicans and white Democrats over this period. Racial resentment is coded to range between zero and one such that values closer to one indicate a greater degree of resentment toward Blacks.

Figure 2. Mean Levels of White Racial Resentment Over Time



Source: American National Election Study Time Series. Note: Data are weighted. Partisan groups exclude “leaners.”

The trends in racial resentment paint a picture consistent with the political circumstances we described above. In the 1990s and early 2000s, during the time in which party leaders on the left and right were not especially polarized on racial issues, we find that white Republicans and Democrats in the mass public were quite similar in levels of racial resentment. To be clear, there was a partisan gap among whites, but not an enormous one. Both groups scored above the midpoint of the resentment scale in every year surveyed between 1992 and 2012, indicating a large degree of racial conservatism among all whites, regardless of partisan identification. This gap began to increase slightly as white Republicans became slightly more resentful in the aggregate during Obama’s presidency, but it grew dramatically in 2016 when Trump entered the political scene. Indeed, from 1992 to 2020, the white

partisan gap in average levels of racial resentment grew from 0.07 to 0.42 points on the zero to one scale.

We also note that these trends reveal greater aggregate changes among whites on the left than those on the right. White Republicans have remained fairly consistent in their levels of racial resentment, reporting average levels fluctuating around 0.70 points for the duration of the time series. What is more, these levels have been notably high over the past three decades but belied by Republican elites' efforts to avoid tapping into this racial hostility for much of this time. By comparison, the sharp decreases in racial resentment among white Democrats seen in 2016 and 2020 were unprecedented. At no point prior to 2016 had white Democrats been nearly so progressive, on average, in their racial attitudes. By 2020, levels of racial resentment had dropped to just 0.27 on the zero to one scale—another precipitous decline preceded only by that observed in 2016.


Our analysis does not allow us to attribute these changes to any one factor. Between 2016 and 2020 we saw a continuation of the political forces we described above and persistent and overt racism from the Trump administration. This period, however, also featured several high-profile killings of Black Americans by police officers, the rise of the Black Lives Matter Movement, and a significant number of racial justice protests. All these events may have contributed to declines in racial resentment among white Democrats. We also cannot determine whether declining levels of resentment are due to partisan sorting, cohort effects, or real attitude change. We suspect these trends reflect some combination of the three, although work using panel data does provide more evidence for genuine attitude change (Engelhardt 2020a). Regardless, we see clearly from these trends that the growing salience of racial issues, led by the political right, has been clearly accompanied by a backlash from whites on the left. It remains to be seen, however, whether shifts among white Democrats will endure in years to come, particularly without Trump's national figure to act as a foil for Democratic elites' newfound commitment to racial progressivism.

Attitudes Toward Muslims

Muslims have been an especially unpopular group in American society, facing unique hostility, particularly in the post-9/11 era (Jardina and Stephens-Dougan 2021; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009; Lajevardi 2020; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; Selod 2015; Sides and Gross 2013). As we described above, Muslims became a specific target of hostility during Trump's 2016 presidential campaign, and studies have shown that anti-Muslim hostility and Islamophobia was strongly linked to Trump support (Jardina and Stephens-Dougan 2021; Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; Tesler 2018). Using the ANES, which began asking whites about their attitudes toward Muslims in 2004, we examine partisan differences among whites in their feelings toward Muslims over time. To do so, we rely on a feeling thermometer measure, in which survey respondents are asked to rate how warm or cold they feel toward Muslims on a 0 to 100 scale in which numbers below 50 represent negative feelings and values above 50 indicate positive feelings.

We present in Figure 3 the average thermometer evaluations white partisans gave Muslims from 2004 to 2020. We have rescaled the 0 to 100 scale to range from 0 to 1, with values closer to 1 indicating more positive feelings. We see that in 2004, the first year in which attitudes were assessed following the 9/11 attacks, that white Republicans and white Democrats had similarly chilly feelings about Muslims, each rating the religious group at around 0.42. In 2008 and 2012, white Democrats' affect toward Muslims increased ever so slightly, but for the most part, was stable. Meanwhile, white Republicans' attitudes grew even more negative, reaching an especially cold score of 0.32 in 2012. These chilly attitudes held steady into 2016. White Democrats, on the other hand, became markedly warmer toward Muslims in 2016, offering for the first time an average rating above the thermometer scale's midpoint (0.55). These diverging trends produced a large, twenty point partisan gap in average ratings of Muslims in 2016.

Figure 3. Affect Toward Muslims



Source: American National Election Study. Note: Data are weighted. Partisan groups exclude “leaners.”

Interestingly, both white Democrats and Republicans reported warmer feelings toward Muslims in 2020. This change may reflect a decrease in the salience of Muslims during the 2020 election, when racial discourse was focused more on racial justice protests centered around Black Americans and when the COVID-19 pandemic dominated public attention. We also note this more positive shift with the caveat that while white Democrats’ evaluations achieved a somewhat warm level of 0.71 in 2020, white Republicans’ feelings hovered around the neutral point of the scale at 0.53. And in general, we see a pattern we largely anticipated: significant and somewhat growing hostility toward Muslims among white Republicans in the years preceding 2016, countered by a significant positive shift in attitudes among white Democrats in 2016. In short, white attitudes

toward Muslims followed a similar pattern to the one we observed with respect to white resentment toward Black Americans.

Immigration Opinion

Over the course of the mid-2000s, shifting attitudes toward immigration contributed to the partisan realignment that had begun decades earlier. According to Hajnal and Rivera (2014) and Abrajano and Hajnal (2015), during this time a confluence of the significant growth of the immigration population, a growing threat narrative about the effects of Latino immigration on Anglo-Protestant American culture, the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of the Democratic Party, and a more apparent division in political elites' views on immigration drove whites to the Republican Party. And even whites who remained in the Democratic Party were fairly conservative in their immigration preferences. To illustrate this, in figure 4 we plot average preferences regarding immigration levels, using an ANES question in which respondents indicate whether they would like immigration levels to be increased, decreased, or kept the same. We recode this item to range from zero to one such that values closer to one indicate greater opposition to immigration. The time trend reveals that whites in both parties were strikingly similar in their immigration views during the 1990s and early- to mid-2000s. Through 2012, both white Democrats and white Republicans scored above the scale's midpoint, indicating an overall preference for decreasing immigration. The consistent opposition to immigration among white Americans, coupled with the growth and immigration and subsequent demographic changes, was a brewing storm.

During the 2016 presidential race, Trump distinguished himself by making immigration the central issue of his campaign (Jardina 2019a). The effect was that immigration became a lightning rod for both racially hostile and racially aggrieved whites. The former opposed immigration because of their animus toward non-white immigrants, particularly Hispanics and Muslims. The latter were anxious about white Americans' numerical decline and threat they believed immigration posed to the


dominant Anglo-Protestant American culture. Indeed, it is clear that white racial consciousness and negative attitudes toward Muslims and Hispanics were strongly associated with whites' immigration opinion in early 2016 (Jardina 2019a). Trump's harsh immigration policy promises, his vow to "make America great again," and his overtly disparaging rhetoric toward Muslims and Mexicans was effective at attracting whites' with these views. Survey data from the Republican presidential primaries in 2015 revealed that Republicans who viewed immigration as a very important issue facing the nation were significantly more likely to support Trump over other GOP candidates (Tesler 2015). There is also now evidence that a notable proportion of voters who supported Obama in 2012 but favored Trump in 2016 did so because of their strong opposition to immigration (Reny, Collingwood, and Valenzuela 2019).

Prior work makes it clear that immigration became significantly tied to political decision-making in the run-up to 2016. But figure 4 shows that immigration opinion also became sharply polarized along partisan lines during this time. In 2012, mean levels of opposition to immigration were 0.68 and 0.60 on a zero to one scale among white Republicans and white Democrats, respectively. In 2016, mean opposition to immigration grew to 0.75 among white Republicans, but dropped to 0.53 among white Democrats. Polarization persisted through 2020 as white Democrats' opposition to immigration continued to decline to an unprecedentedly liberal score of 0.35.

In sum, as was the case with racial attitudes, we see that white immigration opinion followed a striking pattern of polarization. Prior to 2016, white partisans held similar views about immigration and immigrants. Going into 2016, however, the groups began to diverge, as white Republicans grew even more negative in their views while white Democrats became, for the first time since the advent of scientific polling on the issue, positive toward the prospect of increased immigration. And though the question of immigration levels strikes at arguably the core of recent immigration debates, other

work finds that polarization around immigration extends to other issues such as amnesty programs, pathways to citizenship, border security, and refugee admissions (Ollerenshaw and Jardina 2022.).

Figure 4. Mean Opposition to Immigration




Source: American National Election Study. Note: Data are weighted. Partisan groups exclude “leaners.”

White Racial Solidarity

These racial, religious, and immigration threats to white dominance have led to a growing sense of racial grievance and solidarity among white Americans in the twenty-first century (Jardina 2019b, 2020; Jardina and Piston 2019). Such feelings of ingroup consciousness, once more or less equally distributed across partisan lines, have recently become concentrated in the Republican Party, and include a growing perception among some whites that their race experiences significant levels of discrimination. Using data from the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), in figure 5, we trace the proportion of whites by party who agree “discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities”.ⁱⁱ As the figure makes clear, whites

entered the 2010s already somewhat polarized on whether whites faced significant discrimination; however, white partisans diverged further into and following the 2016 elections. Indeed, from 2011 to 2020, the proportion of white Republicans agreeing with the above statement about anti-white discrimination increased from 0.63 to 0.77, while agreement among white Democrats fell from 0.40 to just 0.21.

Figure 5. Proportion Agreeing Anti-White Discrimination is a Significant Problem




Source: Public Religion Research Institute. Note: Data are weighted. Partisan groups exclude “leaners.”

Not only do white Republicans now overwhelmingly believe that anti-white discrimination is at least as bad as discrimination faced by racial minorities, they also appear to believe that whites experience the most discrimination in the U.S. Looking again at PRRI data, in figure 6, we plot the percentage of white partisans who agree different racial or ethnic groups face a lot of discrimination in the U.S. In 2018, 51 percent of white Republicans believed that whites faced significant discrimination, while only 34 percent believed the same about Asians, 51 percent about Blacks, and

47 percent about Hispanics. In 2020, the share of white Republicans who believed that whites faced significant discrimination rose to 60 percent, while their perceptions of discrimination for the three other groups were essentially unchanged. Today, white Republicans tend to overlook the continued discrimination faced by racial minorities in America while also believing anti-white discrimination is pronounced. By contrast, white Democrats in both 2018 and 2020 overwhelmingly felt that Blacks, Hispanics, and, to a lesser extent, Asians experienced discrimination in the U.S., while whites do not.


Figure 6. Agreement that Different Groups Face “A Lot of Discrimination” in U.S.



Source: Public Religion Research Institute. Note: Data are weighted. Partisan groups exclude “leaners.”

This growing sense of racial grievance and victimization among white Republicans is also reflected in the shifting partisan distribution of white racial consciousness. Looking at ANES data from 2012 to 2020, in figure 7, we plot the partisan distribution of whites' who are high in racial consciousness over time. We define high white racial consciousness as scores greater than 0.50 on the zero to one scale, constructed from items developed by Jardina (2019). In 2012, while a plurality (40 percent) of racially conscious whites identified as Republicans, sizeable shares also identified as independents (35 percent) and Democrats (25 percent). By 2016, and with the emergence of Trump, the share of racially conscious whites identifying as Democrats declined to 18 percent, while the share identifying as Republicans increased to 44 percent.ⁱⁱⁱ And in 2020, we observe an even greater shift in the distribution of racially conscious whites toward the GOP, with 63 percent identifying as Republicans and just 12 percent as Democrats. The Republican Party was somewhat more likely than the Democratic Party to host racially conscious whites in 2012; however, it was not until Trump's emergence within the Republican Party that it became the distinct political home for whites with a strong commitment to racial ingroup solidarity.

Figure 7. Partisan Distribution of White Racial Consciousness



Source: American National Election Study. Note: Data are weighted. Partisan groups exclude “leaners.”

Racial Attitudes and Republican Vote Share

We have asserted that recent political and social shifts produced conditions unusually amenable for a candidate like Donald Trump to emerge. Indeed, an obvious implication of white polarization around issues of immigration, race, and religion is that attitudes along these dimensions should become increasingly associated with vote choice over time. Here, we assess the effects of racial resentment, anti-Muslim affect, immigration opinion, and white consciousness on presidential vote choice using ANES data. We focus on three distinct eras of presidential elections: the pre-Obama era (1988-2004), the Obama era (2008-2012), and the Trump era (2016-2020). In figure 8, we plot the predicted two-party vote share of white Americans as functions of each aforementioned group attitude, controlling for gender, education, income, union membership, marriage, age, church attendance, ideology, partisanship, and year fixed effects when pooling ANES samples. To generate

predicted vote shares, we hold continuous covariates to their mean values and categorical variables to their modal values. Higher values indicate greater predicted support for Republican candidates.

Looking first at the effects of racial resentment, we see that whites' resentments have long predicted their voting behavior. In elections between 1988 and 2004, the predicted Republican vote share among whites increases from 20 to 64 percent moving from zero to one on the resentment scale. In the 2008 and 2012 elections, the connection between racial resentment and vote choice intensified, with the predicted Republican vote share increasing from 11 to 78 percent as a function of racial resentment. This result suggests Obama's presence at the top of the Democratic ticket created an unusually strong link between racial attitudes and vote choice. This trend continued into 2016 and 2020, where Trump's predicted vote share was just 5 percent among whites lowest in racial resentment, but 86 percent among extremely resentful whites. Racial resentment has emerged out of the Obama and Trump years as a powerful predictor of whites' voting behavior.


Looking next at anti-Muslim affect, in 2004 when this measure first became available, moving from the minimum to maximum values of anti-Muslim affect only increased the predicted Republican vote share from 53 to 65 percent. During the Obama and Trump eras, however, anti-Muslim affect became highly associated with vote choice. In 2008 and 2012, from the minimum to maximum values of anti-Muslim affect, predicted Republican vote share increased from 20 to 77 percent. We find similar results during the Trump era, an unsurprising result considering conspiracies regarding Obama's "true" religion and Trump's anti-Muslim rhetoric during these years.

Turning next to immigration opinion, we see that in elections prior to 2008, opposition to immigration was only weakly associated with vote choice. The predicted Republican vote share in elections between 1988 and 2004 shifts from 42 percent among whites who would prefer to greatly increase immigration to 54 percent among whites who would prefer to greatly reduce immigration. In 2008 and 2012, immigration views became modestly more predictive of voting behavior, with the

predicted Republican vote share shifting from 32 percent to 66 percent as a function of whites' immigration views. During 2016 and 2020, however, with Trump as the Republican standard-bearer, immigration opinion became more closely associated with vote choice than ever before. For whites supportive of greatly increasing immigration, our model predicts that just 10 percent would vote for Trump. Among whites supportive of greatly *reducing* immigration, however, we predict 76 percent would vote for Trump. Immigration opinion, once largely disconnected from partisan vote choice, has emerged as a powerful predictor of voting behavior in the twenty-first century.

Finally, we turn to the association between white racial consciousness and vote choice. Here, due to the absence of white consciousness items prior their addition in the 2012 ANES, we compare the effects of white consciousness on vote choice in 2012 to its effects in 2016 and 2020. In the 2012 election, white racial consciousness was only modestly associated with Republican voting. Moving from the minimum to maximum of white racial consciousness increases the predicted Republican two-party vote share from 49 to 73 percent. During elections featuring Trump in 2016 and 2020, however, racial consciousness became a much clearer demarcation for whites' voting behavior. In these years, the predicted Republican vote share among whites lowest in racial consciousness declined to just 33 percent but increased to 85 percent among whites highest in racial consciousness. While Trump lost support among whites low on racial consciousness, he received overwhelming support from whites with strong feelings of racial solidarity. Thus, across all four religious, racial, and immigration attitudes we examine, we find support for our contention that whites' group attitudes have become increasingly associated with their voting behavior since Obama's election in 2008, with the trend continuing with Trump's election in 2016.

Figure 8. Predicted Two-Party Republican Presidential Vote Share by Group Attitudes



Conclusion

When public opinion scholars were debating America's "culture wars" in the early 2000s (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Fiorina 2004), a popular refrain was that while elites were polarized on many issues, Americans in the mass public were not. We find some evidence in support of this conclusion when we consider whites' attitudes about race, Muslims, and immigration opinion during the early 2000s. While Black and white Americans have long been notably polarized on many of these issues, white partisans were largely congruent prior to 2016, with whites on both sides of the political aisle exhibiting fairly conservative racial attitudes and attitudes toward Muslims. There was somewhat more partisan divergence early on when it came to immigration opinion, but the gap in preferences across white partisan groups was not extraordinary.

In subsequent years, however, we have seen considerable changes in partisan views on these matters, coupled with a rise in the degree to which many white Americans possess a sense of solidarity with their racial group. Our own analysis, in concert with the work of other public opinion scholars, suggests Trump strategically capitalized on white racial grievances in ways that other mainstream party elites have avoided in recent decades. Trump also appears to have contributed to greater partisan sorting and attitude change in these areas, cultivating extraordinary partisan polarization by the time he left office. Among white Republicans, the effect of these phenomena appears to be a steady, although sometimes slightly growing, conservative, antagonistic, and aggrieved perspective. But Trump has also generated an impressive and unprecedented backlash among white Democrats. Their aggregate levels of racial resentment have declined, their views of Muslims have become much more positive, their immigration preferences much more liberal, and whites with high levels of racial solidarity are now extremely unlikely to identify as Democrats. An optimistic take on racial attitudes in America over this period is that while white Republicans have remained as racially hostile as they have ever been, white Democrats are more liberal and racially

sympathetic (Chudy 2021) on these matters than any group has likely every been in the history of the U.S. The more pessimistic take, however, is that white Republicans and conservatives increasingly find themselves in a socio-political reality that they are uneager to accept. America is racially, ethnically, and religiously diversifying. And while white Democrats have grown to accept, and perhaps even appreciate, this new state of affairs, white Republicans have responded to diversification by retreating into racial solidarity and, in some instances, violently lashing out at the forces they see as conspiring to undermine white Americans' longstanding social, economic, and political dominance.

Of course, we also recognize that white Democrats' liberalization in these areas is not only countered by persistent racial grievance and conservatism among Republicans, but also by the apparent growing and asymmetric importance of these issues on vote choice. As we demonstrate in our analysis, even though white Republicans' levels of grievance and hostility have not markedly shifted in many cases, these issues have nevertheless become more notable drivers of candidate preferences, fostering white Republicans' even greater support of Republican candidates. The same effect does appear to be counter-balanced by white Democrats. But these trends certainly warrant some trepidation; the combination of issue polarization and issue importance is likely to continue to fuel affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2019; Martherus et al. 2019; Steenbergen and Ellis 2006), intensify the already untenable levels of hostility between partisans in U.S. society, and drive the increasingly undemocratic practices of GOP elites (Jardina and Mickey 2022). We should perhaps also be wary of the degree to which this apparent racial and ethnic liberalism among white Democrats consistently and persistently translates into a commitment to racial justice and sincere efforts to promote racial equality. Furthermore, even if white Democrats remain steadfast in their racially egalitarian intentions, we should worry about their ability to out-manuever Republicans' electoral advantages from the Electoral College and widespread partisan gerrymandering. Thus far,

the Democratic Party has made little headway in responding to GOP efforts to consolidate power through Republican legislatures' restrictive voting policies or restrictions on the power of Democratic governors.

Today, these shifts have mounted to a battle over the preservation of U.S. democracy. For much of American history, white people have been aligned in their commitment to a vision of democracy that largely benefits their racial ingroup, with punctuated battles about democratic governance emerging in response to demands to expand the privileges and rights of democracy to marginalized groups, including people of color (Bateman 2018; King 2000; Klinkner and Smith 1999; Lieberman et al. 2019; Mettler and Lieberman 2020). While these battles have often pushed the U.S. toward a more inclusive, multi-racial democracy, racial and ethnic minorities' position and protection has nevertheless remained tenuous. And as battles over issues of race and immigration in the U.S. continue, the strength and concentration of white grievance politics in the Republican Party means that Republican elites now have significant support among their constituents to push the U.S. down a more racially authoritarian path. Democrats and people of color will need to organize and develop new strategies to combat such a trend.

References

- Abrajano, Marisa, and Zoltan L. Hajnal. 2015. *White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 2008. "Is Polarization a Myth?" *Journal of Politics* 70(2): 542–55.
- Ahler, Douglas J. 2018. "The Group Theory of Parties: Identity Politics, Party Stereotypes, and Polarization in the 21st Century." *Forum (Germany)* 16(1): 3–22.
- Baccini, Leonardo, and Stephen Weymouth. 2021. "Gone For Good: Deindustrialization, White Voter Backlash, and U.S. Presidential Voting." *American Political Science Review*: 1–18.
- Bateman, David A. 2018. *Disenfranchising Democracy: Constructing the Electorate in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bateman, David A., Joshua D. Clinton, and John S. Lapinski. 2017. "A House Divided? Roll Calls, Polarization, and Policy Differences in the U.S. House, 1877–2011." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(3): 698–714.
- Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2010. *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America*. 2nd ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Burns, Alexander. 2015. "Donald Trump's Instinct for Racially Charged Rhetoric , Before His Presidential Bid."
- Bursztyjn, Leonardo, Georgy Egorov, and Stefano Fiorin. 2017. "From Extreme to Mainstream: How Social Norms Unravel."
- Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Chen, Anthony S., Robert W. Mickey, and Robert P. Van Houweling. 2008. "Explaining the Contemporary Alignment of Race and Party: Evidence from California's 1946 Ballot Initiative on Fair Employment." *Studies in American Political Development* 22(2): 204–28.
- Chudy, Jennifer. 2021. "Racial Sympathy and Its Political Consequences." *Journal of Politics* 83(1): 122–36.
- Confessore, Nicholas. 2016. "For Whites Sensing Decline , Donald Trump Unleashes Words of Resistance." *The New York Times*: 1–13.
- Craig, Maureen A., and Jennifer A. Richeson. 2014. "On the Precipice of a 'Majority-Minority' America: Perceived Status Threat from the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans' Political Ideology." *Psychological Science* 25(6): 1189–97.
- Dionne, E.J., Norman J. Ornstein, and Thomas E. Mann. 2017. *One Nation After Trump*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- Enders, Adam, and Steven Smallpage. 2016. "Racial Prejudice, Not Populism or Authoritarianism, Predicts Support for Trump over Clinton." *The Washington Post*.
- Engelhardt, Andrew M. 2020a. "Observational Equivalence in Explaining Attitude Change : Have White Racial Attitudes Genuinely Changed?"
- . 2020b. "Observational Equivalence in Explaining Attitude Change : Have White Racial Attitudes Genuinely Changed ? *."
- . 2020c. "Racial Attitudes through a Partisan Lens." *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Enns, Peter, and Ashley Jardina. 2021. "Complicating the Role of Racism and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election." *Public Opinion Quarterly*.
- Feldman, Stanley, and Leonie Huddy. 2005. "Racial Resentment and White Opposition to Race-Conscious Programs: Principles or Prejudice?" *American Journal of Political Science* 49(1): 168–83.
- Fiorina, Morris. 2004. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Frymer, Paul, and John David Skrentny. 1998. "Coalition-Building and the Politics of Electoral Capture during the Nixon Administration: African Americans, Labor, Latinos." *Studies in American Political Development* 12(1): 131–61.
- Gest, Justin, Tyler Reny, and Jeremy Mayer. 2018. "Roots of the Radical Right: Nostalgic Deprivation in the United States and Britain." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(13): 1694–1719.
- Goldman, Seth K., and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2020. "Past Place, Present Prejudice: The Impact of Adolescent Racial Context on White Racial Attitudes." *Journal of Politics* 82(2): 529–42.
- Graham, Amanda et al. 2021. "Who Wears the MAGA Hat? Racial Beliefs and Faith in Trump." *Socius* 7.
- Gray, Rosie. 2017. "Trump Defends White-Nationalist Protesters: 'Some Very Fine People on Both Sides.'" *The Atlantic*: 12–14.
- Green, Donald P., Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hajnal, Zoltan, and Michael U. Rivera. 2014. "Immigration, Latinos, and White Partisan Politics: The New Democratic Defection." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 773–89.
- Haney-Lopez, Ian. 2014. *Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle Class*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Henderson, Michael, and D. Sunshine Hillygus. 2011. "The Dynamincs of Health Care Opinion, 2008-2010: Partisanship, Self-Interest, and Racial Resentment." *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 36(6): 945–60.

- Henry, P. J., and David O. Sears. 2009. "The Crystallization of Contemporary Racial Prejudice across the Lifespan." *Political Psychology* 30(4): 569–90.
- Hooghe, Marc, and Ruth Dassonneville. 2018. "Explaining the Trump Vote: The Effect of Racist Resentment and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments." *PS - Political Science and Politics* 51(3): 528–34.
- Hopkins, Daniel J, and Samantha Washington. 2020. "The Rise of Trump, The Fall of Prejudice? Tracking White Americans' Racial Attitudes Via A Panel Survey, 2008–2018." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 84(1): 119–40.
- Huddy, Leonie. 2013. "From Group Identity to Political Cohesion and Commitment." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack Levy. New York: Oxford University Press, 737–73.
- Huddy, Leonie, and Stanley Feldman. 2009. "On Assessing the Political Effects of Racial Prejudice." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(1): 423–47.
- Huddy, Leonie, Lilliana Mason, and Lene Aarøe. 2015. "Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity." *American Political Science Review* 109(1): 1–17.
- Hutchings, Vincent L. 2009. "Change or More of the Same? Evaluating Racial Attitudes in the Obama Era." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 73(5): 917–42.
- Hutchings, Vincent L., and Ashley Jardina. 2009. "Experiments on Racial Priming in Political Campaigns." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(1): 397–402.
- Iyengar, Shanto et al. 2019. "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22: 129–46.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and Sean J. Westwood. 2015. "Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3): 690–707.
- Jardina, Ashley. 2019a. "White Consciousness and White Prejudice: Two Compounding Forces in Contemporary American Politics." *The Forum* 17(3): 447–66.
- . 2019b. *White Identity Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2020. "In-Group Love and Out-Group Hate: White Racial Attitudes in Contemporary U.S. Elections." *Political Behavior*.
- Jardina, Ashley, Nathan P. Kalmoe, and Kimberly Gross. 2020. "Disavowing White Identity: How Social Distancing Can Change Social Identities." *Political Psychology*.
- Jardina, Ashley, and Robert Mickey. "White Racial Solidarity and Opposition to American Democracy." *ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 69 (1): 79–89.

- Jardina, Ashley, and Trent Ollerenshaw. 2022. "Poll Trends: The Polarization of White Racial Attitudes and Support for Racial Equality in The U.S." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 86 (1): 576-587.
- Jardina, Ashley, and Spencer Piston. 2019. "Racial Prejudice, Racial Identity, and Attitudes in Political Decision Making." In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, Oxford University Press, 1–22.
- . "The Effects of Dehumanizing Attitudes about Black People on Whites' Voting Decisions." *The British Journal of Political Science*.
- Jardina, Ashley, and La Fleur Stephens-Dougan. 2021. "The Electoral Consequences of Anti-Muslim Prejudice." *Electoral Studies* 72(May): 102364.
- Jardina, Ashley, and M. Traugott. 2019. "The Genesis of the Birther Rumor: Partisanship, Racial Attitudes, and Political Knowledge." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics* 4(1).
- Johnson, Jenna. 2016. "Donald Trump to African American and Hispanic Voters: 'What Do You Have to Lose?' - The Washington Post." : 21–23.
- Johnson, Jenna, and Abigail Hauslohner. 2017. "'I Think Islam Hates Us': A Timeline of Trump's Comments about Islam and Muslims." *The Washington Post*: 1–11.
- Kalkan, Kerem Ozan, Geoffrey C. Layman, and Eric M. Uslaner. 2009. "'Bands of Others'? Attitudes toward Muslims in Contemporary American Society." *The Journal of Politics* 71(3): 847–62.
- Kinder, Donald R., and Allison Dale-Riddle. 2012. *The End of Race?: Obama, 2008, and Racial Politics in America*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder, Donald R., and Nicholas J. G. Winter. 2001. "Exploring the Racial Divide: Blacks, Whites, and Opinion on National Policy." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2): 439–56.
- King, Desmond S. 2000. *Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Klinkner, Philip A., and Rogers M. Smith. 1999. *The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in America*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Knowles, Eric D., and Linda R. Tropp. 2016. "Donald Trump and the Rise of White Identity in Politics." *The Conversation*: 1–10.
- Krieg, Gregory. 2017. "Trump's History of Anti-Muslim Rhetoric Hits Dangerous New Low." *CNN*.

- Lajevardi, Nazita. 2020. *Outsiders at Home: The Politics of American Islamophobia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lajevardi, Nazita, and Marisa Abrajano. 2019. "How Negative Sentiment toward Muslim Americans Predicts Support for Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election." *The Journal of Politics* 81(1): 296–302.
- Lajevardi, Nazita, and Kassra A. R. Oskooii. 2018. "Old-Fashioned Racism, Contemporary Islamophobia, and the Isolation of Muslim Americans in the Age of Trump." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics* 3(1): 112–52.
- Lee, Frances E. 2009. *Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- . 2020. "Populism and the American Party System: Opportunities and Constraints." *Perspectives on Politics* 18(2): 370–88.
- Lenz, Gabriel S. 2009. "Reconsidering the Priming Hypothesis." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(4): 821–37.
- Lieberman, Robert C. et al. 2019. "The Trump Presidency and American Democracy: A Historical and Comparative Analysis." *Perspectives on Politics* 17(2): 470–79.
- Martherus, James L., Andres G. Martinez, Paul K. Piff, and Alexander G. Theodoridis. 2019. "Party Animals? Extreme Partisan Polarization and Dehumanization." *Political Behavior* (0123456789).
- Mason, Lilliana. 2018. *Uncivil Agreement*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- Mason, Lilliana, Julie Wronski, and John V. Kane. 2021. "Activating Animus: The Uniquely Social Roots of Trump Support." *American Political Science Review*: 1–9.
- Maxwell, Angie, and Todd Shields. 2019. *The Long Southern Strategy: How Chasing White Voters in the South Changed American Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mettler, Suzanne, and Robert C. Lieberman. 2020. *Four Threats: The Recurring Crises of American Democracy*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Morgan, Stephen L., and Jiwon Lee. 2017. "The White Working Class and Voter Turnout in U.S. Presidential Elections, 2004 to 2016." *Sociological Science* 4: 656–85.
- Mutz, Diana C. 2018. "Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 115(19): 4330–39.

- Ollerenshaw, Trent, and Ashley E. Jardina. "The Polls—Trends: The Asymmetric Polarization of White Immigration Opinion in the United States."
- Pasek, Josh, Tobias H. Stark, Jon A. Krosnick, and Trevor Tompson. 2015. "What Motivates a Conspiracy Theory? Birther Beliefs, Partisanship, Liberal-Conservative Ideology, and Anti-Black Attitudes." *Electoral Studies* 40: 482–89.
- Pérez, Efrén O. 2016. *Unspoken Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Phillips, Kevin P. 1969. *The Emerging Republican Majority*. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House.
- Reny, Tyler T., Loren Collingwood, and Ali A. Valenzuela. 2019. "Vote Switching in the 2016 Election: How Racial Attitudes and Immigration Attitudes, Not Economics, Explain Shifts in White Voting." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 83(1): 91–113.
- Schaffner, Brian F. 2020. *The Acceptance and Expression of Prejudice during the Trump Era*. Cambridge University Press.
- Schaffner, Brian F., Matthew C. Macwilliams, and Tatishe Nteta. 2018. "Understanding White Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism." *Political Science Quarterly* 133(1): 9–34.
- Schickler, Eric. 2016. *Racial Realignment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2015. "White Attitudes about Descriptive Representation in the US: The Roles of Identity, Discrimination, and Linked Fate." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 5(1): 84–106.
- Sears, David O. 1988. "Symbolic Racism." In *Eliminating Racism*, eds. Phyllis A. Katz and Taylor A. Dalmas. Boston, MA: Springer, 53–84.
- Sears, David O., and Christia Brown. 2013. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology Childhood and Adult Political Development*. eds. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears, and Jack S. Levy. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sears, David O., and Carolyn L. Funk. 1999. "Evidence of the Long-Term Persistence of Adults' Political Predispositions." *The Journal of Politics* 61(1): 1–28.
- Sears, David O., and Victoria Savalei. 2006. "The Political Color Line in America: Many 'Peoples of Color' or Black Exceptionalism?" *Political Psychology* 27(6): 895–924.
- Segovia, Francine, and Renatta Defever. 2010. "The Polls - Trends American Public Opinion on Immigrants and Immigration Policy." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 74(2): 375–94.
- Selod, Saher. 2015. "Citizenship Denied: The Racialization of Muslim American Men and Women Post-9/11." *Critical Sociology* 41(1): 77–95.
- Sides, John, and Kimberly Gross. 2013. "Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror." *The Journal of Politics* 75(3): 583–98.

- Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2018. *Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Sides, John, and Lynn Vavreck. 2013. *The Gamble: Choice and Chance in the 2012 Presidential Election*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Silva, Mark. 2009. "In Media Blitz, Obama Says Vitriol Isn't Racial." *LA Times*.
- Smith, Rogers M., and Desmond King. 2021. "White Protectionism in America." *Perspectives on Politics* 19(2): 460–78.
- Sniderman, Paul M., and Thomas L. Piazza. 1993. *The Scar of Race*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Steenbergen, Marco R., and Christopher Ellis. 2006. "Fear and Loathing in American Elections: Context, Traits, and Negative Candidate Affect." In *Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing*, ed. David P. Redlawsk. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 109–33.
- Stewart, Emily. 2018. "Watch John McCain Defend Barack Obama against a Racist Voter in 2008." *Vox*.
- Tesler, Michael. 2012. "The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 690–704.
- . 2015. "How Anti-Immigrant Attitudes Are Fueling Support for Donald Trump." *The Washington Post Monkey Cage*.
- . 2016a. *Post-Racial or Most-Racial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
- . 2016b. "Views about Race Mattered More in Electing Trump than in Electing Obama." *The Washington Post*.
- . 2018. "Islamophobia in the 2016 Election." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 3(1): 153–55.
- Tesler, Michael, and David Sears. 2010a. *Obama's Race*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Tesler, Michael, and David O. Sears. 2010b. *Obama's Race: The 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tesler, Michael, and John Sides. 2016. "How Political Science Helps Explain the Rise of Trump: The Role of White Identity and Grievances." *The Washington Post*.
- Tichenor, Daniel J. 1994. "The Politics of Immigration Reform in the United States, 1981-1990." *Polity* 26(3): 333.

- Tuch, Steven A., and Michael Hughes. 2011. "Whites' Racial Policy Attitudes in the Twenty-First Century: The Continuing Significance of Racial Resentment." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 634(1): 134–52.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., Ted Brader, and Ashley Jardina. 2013. "Immigration Opposition Among U.S. Whites: General Ethnocentrism or Media Priming of Attitudes About Latinos?" *Political Psychology* 34(2): 149–66.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., Vincent L. Hutchings, and Ismail K. White. 2002. "Cues That Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns." *American Political Science Review* 96(1): 75–90.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., Fabian G. Neuner, and L. Matthew Vandenbroek. 2018. "The Changing Norms of Racial Political Rhetoric and the End of Racial Priming." *The Journal of Politics* 80(3): 757–71.
- Valentino, Nicholas A., and David O. Sears. 2005. "Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 672–88.
- Walter, Stefanie. 2021. "The Backlash against Globalization." *Annual Review of Political Science* 24: 421–42.
- Winter, Nicholas J. G. 2008. *Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race and Gender Shape Public Opinion*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Ye Hee Lee, Michelle. 2015. "Donald Trump's False Comments Connecting Mexican Immigrants and Crime - The Washington Post." *The Washington Post*.

ⁱ The 2020 ANES findings should be interpreted with an unusual degree of caution due to changes in data collection that occurred amidst COVID-19 pandemic and non-response biases that have plagued public opinion surveys in recent years, and in which Republican/Trump supporters are less likely to agree to be surveyed. For more details about the ANES Time Series and how its sampling methodology changed in 2020, see <https://electionstudies.org/>. The ANES data can also be freely downloaded here.

ⁱⁱ Each of the ten surveys we analyze from the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) is available at <https://www.prri.org/data-vault/>.

ⁱⁱⁱ Aggregate levels of white racial consciousness were also shifting between 2012 and 2020, and indeed, declining somewhat. This is consistent with Jardina, Kalmoe, and Gross (2020), who found that after the 2016 election, many whites disgusted with Trump reported reduced white identity.

Appendix 1. Data Descriptions

American National Election Study Time Series

The American National Election Study Time Series are a set of cross-sectional surveys which have been fielded around every U.S. presidential election cycle and, on occasion, midterm election cycles. The study population for the ANES is generally defined to include all United States citizens of voting age on or before Election Day. The ANES in recent years has employed stratified random sampling methodologies, and thus, all analyses must use weights for national representativeness. Data collection for the ANES Time Series occurs in two waves: a pre-election wave and a post-election wave. The same cross-section of respondents is contacted for both pre- and post-election interviews. For decades, the ANES had relied on face-to-face, in-person interviewing. In recent years, however, phone and internet samples have supplemented the face-to-face cross-section. The 2020 ANES, in particular, was forced to move away from face-to-face interview modes and toward video, phone, and internet modes due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Eligible citizens in the face-to-face samples reside in the forty-eight coterminous states. However, the internet samples collected by the ANES have tended to include coverage of Alaska and Hawaii, with respondents from these states making up approximately 1 percent of the web sample. For additional documentation about the ANES survey methodology, see <https://electionstudies.org/data-center/>.

Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI)

PRRI is a non-profit, non-partisan research organization focusing on the areas of religion, culture, and public policy. PRRI frequently fields surveys of the U.S. public on topics within these areas, either independently or in partnership with other organizations (e.g., Brookings Institution). These surveys are probability-based, but use various methodologies and interview modes across survey. In Table 1A, we denote the name and date(s) of each survey we analyze in this chapter. All PRRI surveys are made available at <https://www.ppri.org/data-vault/> after a one year embargo.

Table 1A. List of PRRI Surveys

Survey Name	Dates
PRRI 2011 Pluralism, Immigration and Civic Integration Survey	August 1-14, 2011
PRRI/Brookings 2012 Race, Class and Culture Survey	August 2-15, 2012
PRRI July 2014 Survey	July 23-27, 2014
PRRI 2015 American Values Survey	September 11-October 4, 2015
PRRI/Brookings 2016 Immigration Survey	April 4-May 2, 2016
PRRI 2016 American Values Survey	September 1-27, 2016
PRRI/The Atlantic 2016 White Working Class Survey	September 22-October 9, 2016
PRRI 2017 Kids' Wellbeing Survey	April 11-May 12, 2017
PRRI 2018 American Values Survey	September 17-October 1, 2018
PRRI 2019 American Values Survey	August 22-September 15, 2019
PRRI 2020 American Values Survey	September 9-22, 2020

Appendix 2. Question Wordings

Anti-White Discrimination: A dichotomous variable collapsing the four-item response set into two where 0 indicates disagreement and 1 indicates agreement with the statement regarding anti-white discrimination. “Today discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other minorities.” [Response Set: Completely agree/Mostly agree/Mostly disagree/Completely disagree]

Immigration Levels: A continuous variable rescaled to range from 0 (support for increased immigration levels) to 1 (support for decreased immigration levels). “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be...?” [Response Set: Increased a lot/ Increased a little/Left the same as it is now/Decreased a little/Decreased a lot]

Muslim Affect: A feeling thermometer score for Muslims rescaled to range from 0 (cold toward Muslims) to 1 (warm toward Muslims). “How would you rate Muslims?” [Response Set: 0-100]

Racial/Ethnic Discrimination: A set of four dichotomous variables coded as 1 if a respondent believes Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, or Whites (respectively) face a lot of discrimination, and 0 if a respondent does not believe this. “Just your impression, in the United States today, is there a lot of discrimination against any of the following groups, or not?” [Response Set: Yes, there is a lot of discrimination/No, not a lot of discrimination]

Racial Resentment: An index scaled to range from 0 (low racial resentment/racially sympathetic) to 1 (high racial resentment/racially-prejudiced) constructed from four items, the second and third

of which are reverse coded. [Response Set: Agree strongly/Agree somewhat/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree somewhat/Disagree strongly]

1. “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.”
2. “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should to the same without any special favors.”
3. “It's really a matter of some people just not trying hard enough: if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.”
4. “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.”

White Racial Consciousness: A variable ranging from 0 (low consciousness) to 1 (high consciousness) constructed from between two and four items. In the 2012 ANES, the third and fourth consciousness items are unavailable.

1. “How important is being White to your identity?” [Extremely important/Very important/Moderately important/A little important/Not at all important]
2. “How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? Whites.” [A great deal/A lot/A moderate amount/A little/None at all]
3. “How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?” [Extremely important/Very important/Moderately important/A little important/Not at all important]
4. “How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?” [Extremely likely/Very likely/Moderately likely/Slightly likely/Not at all likely]

Appendix 3. Attitudes and Vote Choice Regression Tables

Table 3A. Racial Resentment and Two-Party Vote Choice

	1988-2004	2008-2012	2016-2020
Male	-0.045 (0.132)	0.028 (0.155)	-0.138 (0.136)
Church Attendance	0.666*** (0.165)	0.670*** (0.196)	0.482*** (0.179)
Education	-0.064 (0.287)	-0.309 (0.353)	-1.077*** (0.300)
Income	-0.279 (0.306)	0.649* (0.350)	-0.492* (0.278)
Union	-0.378** (0.167)	-0.065 (0.224)	0.137 (0.208)
Married	0.153 (0.155)	0.295* (0.163)	0.166 (0.159)
Age	-0.513 (0.350)	0.442 (0.376)	-0.398 (0.390)
Ideology	3.213*** (0.378)	3.826*** (0.457)	3.544*** (0.429)
Partisanship	5.380*** (0.229)	5.493*** (0.325)	5.086*** (0.266)
Year (1992)	-0.616*** (0.155)		
Year (2000)	-0.323 (0.236)		
Year (2004)	-0.350* (0.196)		
Year (2012)		-0.053 (0.176)	
Year (2020)			-0.242* (0.142)
Racial Resentment	1.950*** (0.334)	3.391*** (0.381)	4.821*** (0.301)
Constant	-5.110*** (0.446)	-7.528*** (0.483)	-6.027*** (0.388)
Observations	2,636	3,163	6,151

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3B. Anti-Muslim Affect and Two-Party Vote Choice

	2004	2008-2012	2016-2020
Male	0.167 (0.345)	-0.095 (0.152)	-0.341*** (0.131)
Church Attendance	0.677 (0.414)	0.629*** (0.187)	0.300* (0.167)
Education	0.104 (0.728)	-0.455 (0.330)	-1.682*** (0.279)
Income	-0.385 (0.758)	0.589* (0.330)	-0.708*** (0.256)
Union	-1.184*** (0.384)	-0.018 (0.223)	0.201 (0.186)
Married	0.053 (0.387)	0.315** (0.158)	0.259* (0.153)
Age	0.144 (0.905)	0.018 (0.363)	-0.231 (0.364)
Ideology	4.070*** (1.030)	4.191*** (0.422)	4.707*** (0.403)
Partisanship	5.922*** (0.642)	5.607*** (0.324)	5.215*** (0.251)
Anti-Muslim Affect	0.498 (0.862)	2.625*** (0.374)	2.510*** (0.319)
Year (2012)		-0.068 (0.172)	
Year (2020)			-0.537*** (0.136)
Constant	-5.363*** (1.025)	-6.631*** (0.427)	-4.393*** (0.334)
Observations	533	3,175	6,193

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3C. Immigration Opinion and Two-Party Vote Choice

	1992-2004	2008-2012	2016-2020
Male	0.179 (0.156)	0.012 (0.152)	-0.096 (0.131)
Church Attendance	0.950*** (0.206)	0.488*** (0.186)	0.388** (0.170)
Education	0.011 (0.317)	-0.526 (0.328)	-1.307*** (0.295)
Income	0.015 (0.352)	0.543 (0.341)	-0.867*** (0.270)
Union	-0.653*** (0.202)	-0.110 (0.219)	0.166 (0.190)
Married	0.213 (0.179)	0.324** (0.156)	0.272* (0.153)
Age	0.012 (0.374)	0.325 (0.371)	-0.294 (0.379)
Ideology	3.691*** (0.436)	4.290*** (0.428)	4.325*** (0.401)
Partisanship	5.713*** (0.275)	5.562*** (0.317)	5.223*** (0.255)
Year (1996)	-0.319* (0.181)		
Year (2004)	0.282 (0.194)		
Year (2012)		-0.002 (0.173)	
Year (2020)			-0.260* (0.143)
Immigration Opinion	0.513 (0.333)	1.396*** (0.285)	3.391*** (0.287)
Constant	-5.868*** (0.465)	-6.215*** (0.422)	-5.544*** (0.378)
Observations	2,191	3,115	6,133

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3D. White Racial Consciousness and Two-Party Vote Choice

	2012	2016-2020
Male	0.059 (0.177)	-0.085 (0.127)
Church Attendance	0.281 (0.173)	0.238* (0.138)
Education	-0.944*** (0.353)	-1.593*** (0.294)
Income	0.143 (0.380)	-0.618** (0.256)
Union	-0.131 (0.250)	0.176 (0.184)
Married	0.421** (0.174)	0.230 (0.154)
Age	0.328 (0.385)	-0.246 (0.305)
Ideology	4.630*** (0.516)	4.614*** (0.400)
Partisanship	5.911*** (0.398)	5.107*** (0.252)
White Consciousness	1.022** (0.473)	2.457*** (0.329)
Year (2020)		-0.781*** (0.142)
Constant	-5.733*** (0.477)	-4.232*** (0.337)
Observations	2,492	6,232

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1